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↑ Omoregie, J. (2015). Freewill: The degree of freedom within. UK: Author House | ISBN 978-1-5049-8751-6
↑ Hegeler, Edward C. (1910). The Monist, Vol. 20. Open Court. p. 369.
↑ Baumeister, R.F. and Monroe, A.E., 2014. Recent research on free will: Conceptualizations, beliefs, and processes. In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 50, pp. 1–52). Academic Press.
↑ Bobzien, Susanne (1998). Determinism and freedom in Stoic philosophy. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-823794-5. Truy cập ngày 9 tháng 12 năm 2015. ...Aristotle and Epictetus: In the latter authors it was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them. In Alexander's account, the terms are understood differently: what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them.
↑ An argument by Rudolph Carnap described by: C. James Goodwin (2009). Research In Psychology: Methods and Design (ấn bản 6). Wiley. tr. 11. ISBN 978-0-470-52278-3.
↑ Robert C Bishop (2010). “§28.2: Compatibilism and incompatibilism”. Trong Raymond Y. Chiao; Marvin L. Cohen; Anthony J. Leggett; William D. Phillips; Charles L. Harper, Jr. (biên tập). Visions of Discovery: New Light on Physics, Cosmology, and Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. tr. 603. ISBN 978-0-521-88239-2.
↑ See, for example, Janet Richards (2001). “The root of the free will problem: kinds of non-existence”. Human Nature After Darwin: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge. tr. 142 ff. ISBN 978-0-415-21243-4.
↑ McKenna, Michael; Coates, D. Justin (2015). Zalta, Edward N. (biên tập). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – qua Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
↑ Thomas Nagel (1989). “Freedom”. The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press. tr. 112. ISBN 978-0-19-505644-0. Nothing that might be a solution has yet been described. This is not a case where there are several possible candidate solutions and we don't know which is correct. It is a case where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) been proposed.
↑ John R Searle (2013). “The problem of free will”. Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. Columbia University Press. tr. 37. ISBN 978-0-231-51055-4. The persistence of the traditional free will problem in philosophy seems to me something of a scandal. After all these centuries...it does not seem to me that we have made very much progress.
↑ Gregg D Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books. tr. 8. ISBN 978-0-7391-7136-3. One of the strongest supports for the free choice thesis is the unmistakable intuition of virtually every human being that he is free to make the choices he does and that the deliberations leading to those choices are also free flowing..
↑ Corliss Lamont (1969). Freedom of choice affirmed. Beacon Press. tr. 38.
1 2 Azim F Shariff; Jonathan Schooler; Kathleen D Vohs (2008). “The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will”. Trong John Baer; James C. Kaufman; Roy F. Baumeister (biên tập). Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. tr. 183, 190–93. ISBN 978-0-19-518963-6.
↑ TW Clark (1999). “Fear of mechanism: A compatibilist critique of The Volitional Brain”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 6 (8–9): 279–93. Feelings or intuitions per se never count as self-evident proof of anything. Quoted by Shariff, Schooler & Vohs: The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will For full text on line see this Error in Webarchive template: Empty url..
↑ Max Velmans (2002). “How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?”. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 9 (11): 2–29.
↑ William James (1896). “The dilemma of determinism”. The Will to believe, and other essays in popular philosophy. Longmans, Green. tr. 145 ff.
↑ John A Bargh (16 tháng 11 năm 2007). “Free will is un-natural” (PDF). Bản gốc (PDF) lưu trữ ngày 3 tháng 9 năm 2012. Truy cập ngày 21 tháng 8 năm 2012. Are behaviors, judgments, and other higher mental processes the product of free conscious choices, as influenced by internal psychological states (motives, preferences, etc.), or are those higher mental processes determined by those states? Also found in John A Bargh (2008). “Chapter 7: Free will is un-natural”. Trong John Baer; James C. Kaufman; Roy F. Baumeister (biên tập). Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. tr. 128 ff. ISBN 978-0-19-518963-6.
↑ Paul Russell (2002). “Chapter 1: Logic, "liberty", and the metaphysics of responsibility”. Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility. Oxford University Press. tr. 14. ISBN 978-0-19-515290-6. ...the well-known dilemma of determinism. One horn of this dilemma is the argument that if an action was caused or necessitated, then it could not have been done freely, and hence the agent is not responsible for it. The other horn is the argument that if the action was not caused, then it is inexplicable and random, and thus it cannot be attributed to the agent, and hence, again, the agent cannot be responsible for it.... Whether we affirm or deny necessity and determinism, it is impossible to make any coherent sense of moral freedom and responsibility.
↑ McKenna, Michael (2009). “Compatibilism”. Trong Edward N. Zalta (biên tập). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
↑ Libet, (2003). "Can Conscious Experience affect brain Activity?", Journal of Consciousness Studies 10, nr. 12, pp. 24–28.
↑ Kane, Robert; John Martin Fischer; Derk Pereboom; Manuel Vargas (2007). Four Views on Free Will (Libertarianism). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. tr. 39. ISBN 978-1-4051-3486-6.
↑ Vihvelin, Kadri (2011). “Arguments for Incompatibilism”. Trong Edward N. Zalta (biên tập). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
↑ Zagzebski, Linda (2011). “Foreknowledge and Free Will”. Trong Edward N. Zalta (biên tập). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . See also McKenna, Michael (2009). “Compatibilism”. Trong Edward N. Zalta (biên tập). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
1 2 van Invagen, P. (1983) An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-824924-1
↑ Pereboom, D. (2003). Living without Free Will. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-79198-4.
↑ Fischer, J.M. (1983). “Incompatibilism”. Philosophical Studies. 43: 121–37. doi:10.1007/BF01112527.
↑ Dennett, D. (1984). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Bradford Books. ISBN 978-0-262-54042-1.
↑ Kane, R. (1996) The Significance of Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-512656-4
↑ Campbell, C.A. (1957) On Selfhood and Godhood, London: George Allen and Unwin. ISBN 0-415-29624-2
↑ Sartre, J.P. (1943) Being and Nothingness, reprint 1993. New York: Washington Square Press. Sartre also provides a psychological version of the argument by claiming that if man's actions are not his own, he would be in bad faith.
↑ Fischer, R.M. (1994) The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford:Blackwell
↑ Bok, H. (1998) Freedom and Responsibility, Princeton:Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-01566-X
↑ Ginet, C. (1966) "Might We Have No Choice?" In Lehrer, 1966: 87–104.
1 2 Van Inwagen, P. and Zimmerman, D. (1998) Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Oxford: Blackwell
↑ Inwagen, P. (n.d.) "How to think about free will" Error in Webarchive template: Empty url., p. 15.
↑ Lewis, D. (2008). “Are We Free to Break the Laws?”. Theoria. 47 (3): 113–21. doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1981.tb00473.x.
↑ Strawson, Galen (2010). Freedom and belief . Oxford University Press. tr. 6. ISBN 978-0-19-924750-9.
↑ Fischer, John Martin (2009). “Chapter 2: Compatibilism”. Four Views on Free Will (Great Debates in Philosophy). Wiley-Blackwell. tr. 44 ff. ISBN 978-1-4051-3486-6.